Source : M. Broszat & H. Krausnick , Anatomy of the SS State (London, 1965), pp.143-173.
With its subordination to the Reichsfuehrer-SS the only constitutional link remaining between the police and the normal governmental administration was the (personal and direct' subordination of the Chief of Police to the Minister of the Interior. On the surface this would seem to imply a close and binding relationship, in the context of the overall structure of National Socialist domination, however, this form of words "personal and direct" simply set the seal upon the independence of the police. In the Third Reich sovereignty and political power rested with the Fuehrer, not the State. Moreover institutions concerned with political direction had precedence over administrative authorities and amongst the former those with more intimate and direct links to the Fuehrer were considered superior to those further removed from him. In the Third Reich's structure of tyranny the post of Reichsfuehrer-SS was a typical political directing authority and so naturally took precedence over the Reich Minister of the Interior, who was head of a typical administrative department. Personal and direct subordination in no way affected this relative order of precedence; in fact it confirmed and substantiated it. From the point of view of the so-called subordinate, (personal and direct) implied an extremely close relationship with his superior since he had no specific rights or duties attaching to his position within the organisation which his superior had to take into account. If, however, - a man is (personally and directly' subordinate to two authorities), the senior of the two must logically take precedence in every case, and the junior cannot argue that his subordinate has certain specific obligations under normal governmental discipline and practice. All he can do is to bring his personal authority to bear against that of the other superior.
The Reichsfuehrer-SS and Chef der deutschen Polizei were now identical; the Reichsfuehrer-SS, however, was personally and directly sub-ordinate to the Fuehrer. In the event of conflict over control of the Police, therefore, the Minister of the Interior could not quote the legal authority of his Ministry nor could he bring his own authority to bear upon his personal and direct (subordinate), since he would then have been in conflict with the authority of the Fuehrer. The (personal and direct) subordination of the Chief of Police to the Minister of the Interior accordingly implied that, as far as the police were concerned, the normal rules of the civil administration and the principle that administrative action must remain within the law could, and at any time might, be set aside. In fact the police were only indirectly under the Minister and only indirectly a State institution - in other words only in so far as subordination to the Minister did not stand in the way of execution of the Fuehrer's sovereign will. That this was the position is proved by the fact that Hitler habitually sent his instructions direct to the Reichsfuehrer-SS und Her Chef der deutschen Polizei, not through the Minister. When Frick once complained to Hitler of his "subordinate's" independence he was told to leave the Reichsfuehrer as free a hand as possible since with him the police were in good shape. Moreover it is significant that, when nominated Chief of the German Police, Himmler specifically refused to be classified as a government official. 1
There is no doubt that combination of the offices of Reichsfuehrer-SS and Chef der deutschen Polizei implied much more than a mere double banking and was intended to lead to a real merger. This is proved both by the instructions of 1936 and later years and also by the general development of the relationship between the SS and the police. On this subject, Dr Best as the interpreter of the Security Police concept, stated in an article in Deutsches Recht that the official title Reichsfuehrer-SS und Chef der deutschen Polizei was testimony to the fact 'that a permanent identity between the Office of Reichs-fuehrer-SS and that of Chef der deutschen Polizei was intended'. Later in the same-article he says: 'Under the leadership of the Reichs-fuehrer-SS the German Police has become the focus of the Movement and of the State. The significance of this fact cannot be underestimated (sic! - he obviously means "overestimated") not only in its significance for the further reconstruction of the Reich but also in its implications for the security of our people's future.' It is true that Ernst Rudolf Huber in his Verfassungsrecht des Grossdeutschen Reiches [Greater German Reich Constitutional Law] refers to the office of Reichsfuehrer-SS und Chef der deutschen Polizei as an example of the system of personal links; but this is an instance of Huber's attempt to cling to the principle of State sovereignty - and yet he gives a striking description of the Fuehrer's authority as something incompatible with the sovereignty of the State.
Nevertheless the fact that, even if only secondarily, the Chief of the Police was subordinate to the Minister of the Interior was not entirely meaningless. In the first place it was a development typical of the Nationalist Socialist system of domination. The Weimar Constitution was never entirely or explicitly abolished; it was simply undermined and superseded by new case-by-case regulations. Similarly, the standard phrase when the numerous authorities of the Third Reich were created, was that the competence and prerogatives of existing authorities remained unaffected thereby, in fact the flow of official business was diverted, leaving the old channels in existence but atrophied. Moreover, although the police were now constitutionally and organisationally divorced from the authority of the government, this did not mean that all legal, official, technical and organisational links with the previous system were severed, particularly for matters of minor political importance. Time was required for the official character of the police and its internal and organisational regulations to be adapted to the very different forms and rules operative in the SS. Many aspects of police administration therefore remained unaffected but they were allowed to continue only on a "subject to cancellation" basis and only so long as established practice did not run counter to the aims and actions of the political leadership.
In his capacity as Reichsfuehrer-SS und Chef der deutschen Polizei Himmler initiated a fundamental police reorganisation set out in two decrees issued on 26 June 1936. He appointed Police General Kurt Daluege Chief of the Ordnungspolizei [Regular or uniformed police - Orpo ] and SS-Gruppenfuehrer [Lieut. General] Reinhard Heydrich Chief of the Sicherheitspolizei [Security Police - Sipo ] . Under the Chief of the Orpo were the Schutzpolizei [lit. Protection Police - Urban Constabulary- Schupo ] the Gendarmerie [Rural Constabulary] and the Gemeindepolizei [Municipal Police]; the Chief of the Sicher-heitspolizei had charge of the Political Police and the Kriminalpolizei [Criminal Police - Kripo ] . The corresponding authorities at Ministry level were the two Hauptaemter [departments], Ordnungspolizei and Sicherheitspolizei. Within the SicheHauptamt the "Political Police" side was represented in practice by the Gestapo and the "Criminal Police" by the Prussian Landeskriminalpolizeiamt [Land Criminal Police Office], the latter being re-christened Reichskriminal-polizeiamt [Reich Criminal Police Office - RKPA] on 16 July 1937. When the Gestapa was acting as a Ministry authority it used the signature block Hauptamt Sicherheitspolizei; when acting as an executive administrative authority it used the title "Gestapa". Similarly with the criminal police the same authorities uthe title Hauptamt Sicherheitspolizei when acting as a Ministry authority, and Reichskriminalpolizeiamt when acting as an executive authority. According to an establishment of early 1938 Hauptamt Sicher-heitspolizei was organised as follows:
Chief of the Sicherheitspolizei.
Private Office.
Main Bureau (Hauptbuero - S-HB).
Private Office of Head of Bureau.
Budget in so far as not dealt with by V.2 below.
Salaries, etc.
Official Requirements.
Administrative and Legal Division [ Amt Verwaltung und Recht-V ]
V.1 Organisation and Law.
V.2 Budget and Supply.
V.3 Personnel I.
V.4 Personnel II (Kripo) .
V.5 Training.
V.6 Passports and Identity Papers.
V.7 Foreign Police Forces, Frontier Security, Correspondence on Legal Assistance in other countries in Police or Criminal matters.
V.8 Armed Forces and National Defence.
V.9 Technical Matters.
Political Police Division [ Amt Politische Polizei - PP]
PP.IIE Economic, Agricultural and Socio-Political Matters, Societies.
PP.IIG Radio Watch.
PP.IIH Party Matters, Party Organizations and Affiliated Formations.
PP.IIJ Foreign Political Police Forces.
PP.IIBER Reports Section.
PP.IIP Press.
PP.IIS Suppression of Homosexuality and Abortion.
PP.III. Counter Espionage.
Criminal Police Division [ Amt Kriminalpolisei - S-Kr]
S-Kr.1 - S-Kr.3
Sections dealing with all matters falling within the competence of the Criminal Police.
The significance of the creation of the new office Reichsfuehrer-SS und Chef der deutschen Polizei together with the 1936 reorganisation of the German police is therefore as follows:
1 Both constitutionally and organisationally the entire German police force throughout the Reich was centralised; the centralised political police organisation already existing in practice was given de jure status. A circular issued by Himmler on 20 September 1936 formally charged the Gestapo with all tasks falling to the Political Police Commander of the Laender. In subsequent years centralisation of the entire German police force both for technical and personal administration proceeded in regular stages, the most noteworthy steps being the two laws concerning police financial measures dated 19 March 1937 and 28 March 1940 together with the Police Personnel Law of 24 June 1937.
2 The creation-of the office Reichsfuehrer-SS und Chef der deutschen Polizei implied a real merger between an institution under the authority of the Fuehrer and a governmental office; this implied that the decision of principle had been taken to remove the entire police force from the sphere of influence of the State. In the case of the Sicherheitspolizei not only was this process fully completed in later years but a claim was staked to form a "Political Administration" which in fact competed successfully with the State administration in all matters of political importance.
3 The practical effect of the division of the police force as a whole into two main branches, Ordnungspolizei and Sicherheitspolizei, was to constitute the Political Police as an independent branch and at the same time draw the Criminal Police into the sphere of influence of the Political Police. A process was thus initiated harmonising the Criminal Police organisation with that of the Political Police and bringing Criminal Police practice increasingly into line with that of the Political Police - and this process continued throughout the entire period of National Socialist domination.
4 The introduction of the title Hauptamt [department] - a title which did not exist in the governmental hierarchy- for the two central offices of the Ordnungspolizei and Sicherheitspolizei was the outward and visible sign that Himmler's aim of incorporating the police into the SS had been achieved. That this was his object is confirmed by the fact that he never set up a separate Chief of the German Police office; he dealt with matters concerning this aspect of his activities through his own personal staff, to which he merely added one, sometimes two, police aides. In an SS order of 9 November 1936 setting out the then existing SS-Hauptaemter, Hauptamt Ordnungs-polizei is shown; Hauptamt Sicherheitspolizei on the other hand does not figure since "SS-wise" it was represented by the SD-Hauptamt, which of course was also headed by Heydrich.
The four changes decided upon with the creation of the Reichs-fuehrer-SS und Chef der deutschen Polizei, all of decisive importance for subsequent developments, were therefore:
1 Centralisation of the police.
2 De-governmentalization of the police.
3 Differentiation between the Gestapo and the remainder of the police force and inclusion of the Kripo in the sphere of the Gestapo.
4 Incorporation of the police into the SS.
The SD
The Sicherheitsdienst RFSS or SD [SS Security Service] was set up in 1931 with Reinhard Heydrich at its head. In spring 1933 he was allowed his own central office and his own organisation covering the entire Reich: SD Oberabschnitte [Regions] and Abschnitte [Districts] were set up paralleling the Oberabschnitte and Abschnitte of the AIIgemeine SS [General SS]. The AIIgemeine SS, the SD and the Politische Bereitschaften [Political Warm Squads], also formed in 1933, were at that time three separate branches of the Gesamt-SS [SS as a whole]. In contrast to the Politische Bereitschaften which later developed into the Verfuegungstruppe [General Service SS Troops] or Waffen-SS [armed SS], the SD was always borne on the books of the Nazi Party Treasurer.
As Roehm had wished to turn the SA into a National Socialist "People's Army" to supplant the Reichswehr, so Heydrich's long-term plans envisaged making the official security police superfluous or at least down-grading it to semi-auxiliary status; his object was to bring every single individual in Germany under continuous supervision. As with the SA, however, the dream did not materialise. Particularly in the early years of National Socialist domination the SD did exert some political influence and in the political police field competed tenaciously with the official State organisation; this influence must not, however, be overestimated, for in the ultimate issue the SD proved neither sufficiently numerous nor sufficiently well trained to take over in tots the tasks of the Security Police. Moreover since Himmler and Heydrich quickly contrived to assume authority over the Political Police of all the Laender, it was basically the SD which became superfluous. In any case organisationally it never became the great machine, which it was intended to be in 1933. It is significant that from 1936 onwards it was the police and not the SD which, together with the AIIgenaeine SS and the Waffen-SS, were looked upon as the "three pillars" of the SS.
As compensation for their exclusion from executive political duties and supervision of particular individuals, the SD was given intelligence duties of a more general nature; it was, for instance, to report on developments within the various spheres of public life - the economy, cultural affairs, science, the churches, etc. The resulting Reich Information Reports' or "Special Reports" on specific problems were circulated to a limited number of senior Party and State functionaries. Examples of SD reports were:
Debasement of the basic National Socialist virtues in German-language literature since 1933.
The situation in the Protestant Church and the various sects; the effects therinjurious to the State.
Poisoning of the relationship between the national armed forces and the State and Party ideologists.
In an address to a Wehrmacht political course of instruction given in January 1937 Himmler described the role of the SD as follows:
'The primary SD fields of activity are communism, political activity by religious persuasions, and reaction. The SD is not, however, concerned with detailed executive problems. You will perhaps observe this during your visit, so I need say only a few words here. The SD is concerned only with major ideological questions.
Take an example: suppose there were an attempt on the other side of the frontier to produce an Austrian racial theory and so gradually turn Austria into a sort of Switzerland. Seven or eight hundred years ago this happened in the case of Switzerland and, although they speak German, the Swiss now no longer feel themselves akin to Germany; similarly a few centuries ago we lost Holland and the whole lower German region; suppose now, through propaganda supported by scientific theory and scientific work in the universities, this problem of the south-east German race or the Austrian race was drummed into people long enough to produce a spirit of separatism. Then we should be interested in the following: which German professors support this theory and with which string-pullers abroad or elsewhere are they connected? These are problems, which interest us. As a Security Service we are not, for instance, interested in the problem of whether the Communist Party cell organisation in Berlin-Wedding has been broken up or not. That is a question for the executive. One day it will be broken up or perhaps it already has been and if it is reformed it will be broken up again. That sort of thing does not interest us; that will not bring Germany down. We are interested in this sort of thing: what major plans has the Comintern in the years to come, in which country does it propose to make an effort, what Bolshevist influences can be detected in Freemason circles abroad, which way do the threads run and whither are the major emissaries going? Recently, for instance, 800 emissaries went to Austria. They arrived there three or four months ago, so for us this poses a burning question : what is going on in Austria? What are their plans, what major organisation plans have they for Germany, from which direction will they attack, what are the connections between Bolshevism and, for instance, the Confessional Front, why are they supporting these gullible clerics when their ultimate object is atheism, how can that suddenly be? Then again we are interested in the economic influence which the Jews are acquiring (again only the overall plan in general) in order to strangle us, sabotage us or manipulate the currency. All these questions the SD studies scientifically and - the phrase is apt here - using general staff methods; these studies frequently take years and in many, if not the majority, of cases we are still in the early stages.'
References:
See Neufeldt, op. Cit. Frick's lack of authority is illustrated in Jochen Klepper's diary and in the (unpublished) memoirs of an official in the then Reich Office for Ecclesiastical Affairs. The lartter says: It was in fact striking that any appeal to Frick concerning the behaviour of the Gestapo was invariably ineffective. Such representations were not dealt with by Frick but by the RSHA which was in practise the highest authority.'
